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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RIGHTS NOT FUNDAMENTAL: DISABILITY AND THE RIGHT TO
MARRY
ABSTRACT
Disabled people have long been systematically excluded from marriage,
despite its personal, religious, cultural, and symbolic importance, and despite it
being treated as a fundamental right in other contexts. This exclusion has been
perpetuated by arcane laws that require Social Security and Medicaid
beneficiaries to include their spouse’s income and assets in eligibility
calculations. Since eligibility is contingent upon very little income and very few
assets, couples who marry and intend to keep benefits are forced to live far
below the poverty line in order to meet income and asset criteria, and many
people are unable to make such a serious financial sacrifice. As a result,
disabled people who are dependent on benefits are often forced to choose
between a long-term relationship and needed health care services that are
exclusively offered by Medicaid. This disability marriage penalty runs afoul of
both disability rights and marriage policies that assure, on one hand, that
presence of a disability does not preclude a person from enjoying full rights to
inclusion in the United States, and on the other, that marriage is a fundamental
right that should not be curtailed for most reasons related to identity. Partial
solutions to the disability marriage penalty have been proposed and, in some
cases, implemented, but no complete solution yet exists. However, there is some
promise that the Biden administration and Congress as it currently stands will
begin to take legislative or executive action to abolish this outdated penalty and
finally allow people with disabilities the freedom to marry without fear of losing
the benefits that enable their continued independence and survival.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have to choose between two paths in life. The first path
includes a happy marriage to someone you love, but your life is shortened by a
health condition that you need special tools to manage, and those tools are out
of reach. The second path gives you those tools, but the path is long and lonely,
and you will never be allowed to create a home with someone you love. For
many disabled people who are dependent on public benefits, this choice is
anything but hypothetical.
Medicaid is the only public health care program that provides necessary
tools for survival for many disabled people in the United States. 1 It is the only
government program that pays for long-term nursing care and other benefits like
personal care attendants, certain medications, durable medical equipment, and
transportation to medical appointments. 2 It provides critical benefits for ten
million disabled people. 3 In many states, a person is automatically eligible for
Medicaid if they receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI), though states may impose additional standards. 4
Twelve million disabled Americans receive SSI or SSDI, and most have no
other major source of income. 5 Eligibility for either program is contingent on a
very low income and very few assets. 6 Although income limits vary widely by
state, most states impose an asset limit of $2000 for individuals and $3000 for
couples, figures that have not changed since 1989 and do not adjust for
inflation. 7 When counting income and assets for disability benefits, regulations
explicitly state that the Social Security Administration (SSA) “expect[s the nondisabled] spouse to use some of his or her income to take care of some of [the
disabled spouse’s] needs.” 8 As a result of the financially demanding eligibility
1. E.g., Carly Stern, Forced to Divorce: Americans with Disabilities Must Pick Marriage or
Health Care, OZY (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.ozy.com/the-new-and-the-next/forced-to-divorceamericans-with-disabilities-must-pick-marriage-or-health-care/92284 [https://perma.cc/7S5Q-9A
72].
2. Julia M. Hargraves, Financing Long-Term Care in Missouri: Limits and Changes in the
Wake of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 73 MO. L. REV. 839, 841 (2008); B.J. Stasio, People
with Disabilities and the Federal Marriage Penalties, IMPACT (Spring/Summer 2010), https://pub
lications.ici.umn.edu/impact/23-2/people-with-disabilities-and-the-federal-marriage-penalties.
3. People with Disabilities, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N,
https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/people-with-disabilities/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://per
ma.cc/44XR-C4V2].
4. SHAWN FREMSTAD & REBECCA VALLAS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE FACTS ON
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR
WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2013).
5. Id. at 1, 2.
6. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Marriage Penalty, DISABILITY RTS. N.C. 1 (2015),
https://disabilityrightsnc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/SSI-Marriage-Penalty.pdf.
7. FREMSTAD & VALLAS, supra note 4, at 8–9.
8. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1160(a)(1) (2005).
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criteria, marriage to or by a disabled person is a financial undertaking that is
impossible for many to endure. If parties do get married, they face a severe
penalty that can result in significant financial loss and, potentially, a catastrophic
loss of health care coverage. 9 Additionally, if an unmarried couple lives together
and is judged to be “holding out” in order to keep benefits while pooling
resources, the couple is treated as if they are married, and they still face a
penalty. 10
The disability marriage penalty defies the assurance of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) that “physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish
a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society.” 11 American society
highly values marriage, as evidenced by decades of policy attention and legal
significance. American legal policy lauds marriage as “the relationship that is
the foundation of the family in our society” and affords it many benefits and
protections. 12 Likewise, Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights asserts that “[m]en and women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.” 13
Despite these legal and policy declarations, many disabled people are effectively
deprived of those rights.
No complete solution to the disability marriage penalty currently exists.
However, some partial solutions, like voluntary impoverishment, civil unions,
and spousal refusal, have come from elder law. 14 In addition, the proposed
Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2019 was a promising
solution, and President Joe Biden made a campaign promise when running for
President in 2020 to “[r]eform the SSI program so that it doesn’t limit
beneficiaries’ freedom to marry, save, or live where they choose.” 15 However,
there has not been significant scholarship on this topic from the disability law
9. Rabia Belt, Disability: The Last Marriage Equality Frontier 2 (Stan. Pub. L., Working
Paper No. 2653117, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2653117.
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). For an excellent explanation of the disability marriage penalty
and a concise argument in favor of abolishing it, see Andrew Pulrang, A Simple Fix for One of
Disabled People’s Most Persistent, Pointless Injustices, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2020, 2:04 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewpulrang/2020/08/31/a-simple-fix-for-one-of-disabled-peo
ples-most-persistent-pointless-injustices/?sh=152abc886b71.
12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 666 (2015).
13. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
14. See John A. Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment to Obtain Government Benefits, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 81 (2003); Heidi L. Brady & Robin Fretwell Wilson, The
Precarious Status of Domestic Partnerships for the Elderly in a Post-Obergefell World, 24 ELDER
L.J. 49, 51 (2016); LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR
DISABLED CLIENT ¶ 14.03[3][c] (2019), Westlaw.
15. Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2019, H.R. 4280, 116th Cong. § 2
(2019); The Biden Plan for Full Participation and Equality for People with Disabilities, JOE BIDEN,
https://joebiden.com/disabilities/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter The Biden Plan].
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perspective, and existing solutions lack the perspective of disabled people who
would be most affected by new policies.
Nevertheless, a solution to the disability marriage penalty is possible and
would likely involve a patchwork of partial solutions from other areas of law.
Part II of this Article explores two foundational issues: (1) the importance of
acquiring and keeping disability benefits for those who need them, and (2)
marriage as a highly valued policy priority in the United States. Part III examines
the parallel development of marriage equality and disability rights and then joins
both histories in a discussion of disability marriage rights and the origins of the
disability marriage penalty. Part IV is a discussion of existing solutions from
other areas of law and how these solutions may apply to the disability marriage
penalty. Part V analyzes recent direct solutions, like the Supplemental Security
Income Restoration Act and President Biden’s campaign promise to eliminate
the disability marriage penalty. It also offers a set of principles that must inform
any new solution.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the heart of the disability marriage penalty lay two important values that
have been thrust into unnecessary conflict: the need for health care and the
cultural and social significance of marriage. Disability rights activists have long
stressed the necessity of and need for Medicaid, 16 as it is often the only program
that offers important health-related supports for disabled people. 17 On the other
hand, modern sociologists have recognized marriage as a health-promoting
institution and American federal policies have enforced its importance. 18 The
forced conflict between health care and marriage is one major reason that the
disability marriage penalty should be repealed.
A.

Disability and the Need for Medicaid

Medicaid is a federal insurance program designed to address the unique
health care needs of the aged, blind, and disabled. 19 As the primary taxpayerfunded program for long-term care and the only government program that pays
for long-term nursing care, Medicaid provides critical benefits for ten million

16. See, e.g., Alice Wong, My Medicaid, My Life, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/05/03/opinion/my-medicaid-my-life.html [perma.cc/97WT-BHZF].
17. See Stern, supra note 1.
18. Debra Umberson & Jennifer Karas Montez, Social Relationships and Health: A Flashpoint
for Health Policy, 51(S) J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. S54, S59 (2010). See generally Linda C.
McClain, Federal Family Policy and Family Values from Clinton to Obama, 1992-2012 and
Beyond, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1621, 1661 (2013).
19. JULIA PARADISE ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID
AT 50, at 1 (May 2015).
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disabled people in America. 20 Benefits include personal care attendants,
medications, durable medical equipment, and transportation to medical
appointments. 21 For many disabled people, the loss of Medicaid can be
“devastating, life changing, and even life threatening.” 22 Disabled activist and
blogger Dominick Evans elaborated:
I would lose home healthcare services, which pay for personal care attendants
to come into my home and get me out of bed, get me dressed, help me to take a
bath, give me my medication, eat my meals, and pretty much any other activity
of daily living. Without these services, I would end up stuck in bed. 23

For many Medicaid recipients like Dominick, losing Medicaid is not an
option.
1. Eligibility for Medicaid Through SSI and SSDI
Medicaid eligibility in most states is tied to SSI or SSDI, and some states
impose additional requirements. 24 Eligibility requirements for SSI and SSDI
assure that it is the “income source of last resort” for disabled people, requiring
beneficiaries to exhaust all other resources before qualifying. 25 SSI also imposes
strict asset limits––$2000 for an individual and $3000 for a couple––that force
beneficiaries to remain in poverty, preventing them from establishing enough of
a savings to, for example, pay for unforeseen expenses like home repairs. 26
Some resources, however, are exempt from asset calculations, including a life
insurance policy worth less than $1500, a burial plot, a wedding and engagement
ring, a car worth less than $4500, and “property which is so essential to the
patient’s support that it warrants exclusion.” 27 Though this may provide some
breathing room for those who can invest in a protected asset like a house, a
national housing study from 2007 found that the average rent for a studio or
efficiency apartment was more than the maximum SSI monthly benefit. 28 Thus,

20. Michael Farley, When “I Do” Becomes “I Don’t”: Eliminating the Divorce Loophole to
Medicaid Eligibility, 9 ELDER L.J. 27, 29 (2001); Hargraves, supra note 2, at 839; People with
Disabilities, supra note 3.
21. Stasio, supra note 2.
22. Id.
23. Dominick Evans, Disabled People Penalized for Getting Married, AUDACITY MAG. (Jan.
2, 2019), https://www.audacitymagazine.com/disabled-people-penalized-for-getting-married/
[https://perma.cc/A8FP-M2WM].
24. Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility/index.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/4RF4-W6SW].
25. Richard Balkus & Susan Wilschke, Treatment of Married Couples in the SSI Program,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 1 (Dec. 2003), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/issuepapers/ip2003-01.pdf.
26. FREMSTAD & VALLAS, supra note 4, at 8–9.
27. Farley, supra note 20, at 34.
28. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Marriage Penalty, supra note 6, at 2.
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even if a beneficiary wishes to invest in a protected resource, they are often
priced out from doing so.
As a result of harsh income requirements, SSI and SSDI beneficiaries are
rarely able to maintain a standard of living comparable to those living above
subsistence-level. 29 A survey from 2015 found that median earnings for nondisabled people was over $30,469 per year, which is nearly 150% the median
for disabled people ($20,250 per year). 30 SSDI typically replaces less than half
of a beneficiary’s earnings from before they became disabled. 31 If a person
receiving SSI can work at all, any earned income beyond a very small threshold
($65 per month in 2019) creates a dollar-for-dollar decrease in SSI, effectively
taxing earned income by 50%. 32 As a result of these factors, many disabled
people receiving either benefit have a low standard of living that they are unable
to increase by working. Since one in four American adults identifies as disabled,
this means a quarter of the population has a much higher chance of experiencing
significant economic hardship than the rest of the population. 33
2. The Impact of Marriage on Eligibility for SSI and SSDI
Contemplating these options and limitations, one may consider sharing
expenses and pooling resources by getting married or living with another person.
However, in dealing with complicated eligibility rules, a beneficiary may
struggle to calculate how a marriage (actual or perceived) would impact their
benefits. 34 Furthermore, administrators and support workers can commit errors
that affect beneficiaries’ continued eligibility, sometimes by giving bad advice
and sometimes by giving no advice at all. 35 Simply searching “disability
marriage penalty” on the internet results in dozens of questions from and stories
about disabled people who were unaware of the disability marriage penalty
before getting engaged and were forced to postpone their wedding, cancel their

29. FREMSTAD & VALLAS, supra note 4.
30. Disability & Socioeconomic Status, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/pi/ses/re
sources/publications/factsheet-disability.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GKA5CAD7].
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI Income, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.
(2020), https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-income-ussi.htm [https://perma.cc/4Y2Q-ZLZY].
33. Debra L. Brucker et al., More Likely to Be Poor Whatever the Measure: Working-Age
Persons with Disabilities in the United States, 96 SOC. SCI, Q. 273, 287 (2015); Catherine A. Okoro
et al., Prevalence of Disabilities and Health Care Access by Disability Status and Type Among
Adults — United States, 2016, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 882, 882 (Aug. 17,
2018); FREMSTAD & VALLAS, supra note 4, at 1.
34. W. BRADFORD WILCOX ET AL., INST. FOR FAM. STUD., MARRIAGE, PENALIZED: DOES
SOCIAL-WELFARE POLICY AFFECT FAMILY FORMATION? 1, 16 (2016).
35. David C. Stapleton et al., Dismantling the Poverty Trap: Disability Policy for the TwentyFirst Century, 84 MILBANK Q. 701, 714 (2006).
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wedding, or even break up upon realizing that marriage would lead to financial
ruin for them and their potential spouse. 36
Both SSI and SSDI beneficiaries are penalized if they choose to marry.
When a person receives the Childhood Disability Benefit (CDB)—a type of
SSDI for those who were disabled before age twenty-two—they automatically
lose their benefits if they marry someone who is not also a Social Security
beneficiary. 37 For SSI beneficiaries, the rules are more complicated. When an
SSI beneficiary marries a non-beneficiary, the non-beneficiary’s income and
assets are factored into the beneficiary’s eligibility determination. 38 Regulations
require that this must happen, regardless of whether the spouse’s income or
assets are actually available to the beneficiary. 39
When two SSI beneficiaries marry each other, their combined income and
asset allowances decrease by 25% per person, meaning their combined
allowances will equal 150% of their individual allowances, rather than the 200%
they would have if they did not get married. 40 SSA justifies that decrease by
arguing that married couples can live more frugally by combining resources. 41
However, this claim does not acknowledge that people often live with another
person to economize expenses without getting married and that dual-income,
non-beneficiary couples can get married without taking a pay cut. 42 As a result
of the dual-beneficiary marriage cut, the poverty rate for that type of couple is
45.1%, rather than the much lower 9.8% rate for unmarried individuals on SSI. 43

36. See, e.g., Edward V. Wilcenski & Laurie Hanson, What Happens When Persons Living
with Disabilities Marry?, SPECIAL NEEDS ALL.: THE VOICE (June 2010), https://www.spe
cialneedsalliance.org/the-voice/what-happens-when-persons-living-with-disabilities-marry-2/
(answering common questions from people with disabilities seeking to understand what would
happen to their benefits if they were to get married); Asaf Shalev, The Government Is Still Telling
Disabled People Whom They Can Marry and This Woman Has Had Enough of It., MONTEREY
CNTY. WKLY. (June 4, 2020), https://www.montereycountyweekly.com/people/831/the-govern
ment-is-still-telling-disabled-people-whom-they-can-marry-and-this-woman-has/article_f26b397
6-a5f1-11ea-ab78-83504e6e570f.html (describing the predicament of an SSDI beneficiary who
was advised by SSA not to marry her non-beneficiary fiancé if she needed to keep her benefits);
Stern, supra note 1 (relating several stories of beneficiaries affected by the disability marriage
penalty).
37. Sparrow Rose Jones, Disabled People Have the Right to Live Happily Ever After, ROOTED
IN RTS. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://rootedinrights.org/disabled-people-have-the-right-to-live-happilyever-after/ [https://perma.cc/A4SQ-44TM]. See also Shalev, supra note 36.
38. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1160(a)(1) (2005).
39. § 416.1160(a).
40. Jones, supra note 37.
41. Balkus & Wilschke, supra note 25, at 3.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id.
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TABLE 1: EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE ON SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Type of Benefit
Received
SSI

SSDI
SSDI (CDB)

Marriage to. . .
Fellow beneficiary

Non-beneficiary

Asset and income
allowances decrease by
25% per person
(household totals
150% of individual
amounts)

Spouse’s income and
assets are included in
calculation (must
remain below 83% of
poverty level)1

No longer eligible

No longer eligible

Still eligible

No longer eligible

Perhaps due to this penalty, only twenty-four percent of adult disabled SSI
beneficiaries are married, compared to fifty-seven percent of all adults in the
United States. 44 SSI beneficiaries, particularly those with medical needs or
disabilities that are best served by Medicaid, are deterred from marrying out of
fear that the crucial services that keep them healthy and barely financially afloat
will be cut. 45 Furthermore, divorce rates among disabled people are significantly
higher than those of the greater population. Between 2009 and 2018, almost 11.1
million disabled Americans got divorced, almost twice the number that got
married. 46 In the same period, 1.5 million non-disabled Americans got divorced,
less than a third of the number that got married. 47 In the words of one disabled
writer, “SSI and Medicaid rules are set up to make marriage and having
necessary healthcare benefits incompatible.” 48
Furthermore, the disability marriage penalty can be imposed even if no
marriage exists. 49 SSA considers someone a spouse if they are legally married
to the beneficiary, if SSA has previously decided that they are entitled to the
beneficiary’s Social Security benefits, or if they are cohabitating with the

44. Id. at 3.
45. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Marriage Penalty, supra note 6. See also Gabriella
Garbero, The “Fundamental” Right to Marriage, THE GIRL WHO SITS (Jan. 10, 2021),
https://thegirlwhosits.com /2021/01/10/the-fundamental-right-to-marriage/.
46. Stern, supra note 1.
47. Id.
48. Eryn Star, Marriage Equality Is Still Not a Reality: Disabled People and the Right to
Marry, THE ADVOC. MONITOR (Nov. 14, 2019), http://www.advocacymonitor.com/marriage-equal
ity-is-still-not-a-reality-disabled-people-and-the-right-to-marry/?fbclid=IwAR3gIf3cuzSBhWBp
Gru47Oeo8QaMCJEHA1rZOaZAYg29Avsy9VhoaQOAp4k [https://perma.cc/3FMV-9LTZ].
49. Robert E. Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage Penalties and Support
Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 570 (2006).
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beneficiary and the couple is holding themselves out as married. 50 The question
of whether a couple is “holding out” is always subjective and includes factors
like how mail is addressed and how partners introduce each other, as perceived
by the assigned SSA employee. 51 Many disabled beneficiaries fear even
acknowledging a relationship publicly, feeling that public recognition is not
worth the risk to such important benefits. 52
B.

Benefits of Marriage

Despite the lack of consideration given to couples with disabilities, SSA has
acknowledged the importance of benefit policies that promote social ties like
marriage. 53 Federal policy discussions have been couched at the intersection of
welfare and family promotion, beginning with President Clinton’s insistence on
giving people tools to succeed at home and at work. 54 He wanted to eliminate
false choices (i.e. the choice between a job and family) and wanted to end
welfare dependence “as a way of life.” 55 Implicit in this intention is a pointed
avoidance of the fact that some disabled people need Medicaid to survive.
Additionally, Clinton’s family policy encouraged marriage for some, but
excluded same-sex couples with the Defense of Marriage Act. 56 Thus, in a way
it was “an end to the era of false choices” because some populations were given
no choice at all. 57
Under the George W. Bush administration, a tax-related marriage penalty
was eliminated. 58 President Bush also stated that his administration was
“working to make sure that the Federal Government does not penalize
marriage” and would alleviate regulations that made it difficult for families to
climb out of poverty. 59 However, no policies under this administration did
anything for the disability marriage penalty.
One positive policy trend during the Clinton and Bush administrations was
the recognition that social and family ties, including marriage, are associated
with increased health and well-being. 60 Beginning with the Clinton
administration, the language of family became more prevalent in policy
discussions. 61 Additionally, the Healthy Marriage Initiative of the Bush era
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Stern, supra note 1.
Evans, supra note 23.
Balkus & Wilschke, supra note 25.
McClain, supra note 18, at 1624.
Id. at 1624, 1628.
Id. at 1624.
Id. at 1629.
Rains, supra note 49, at 595–96.
Id.
Umberson & Montez, supra note 18.
McClain, supra note 18.
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recognized that the health of children and spouses are improved when marriages
are characterized by supportive interactions. 62
Correspondingly, social science research has found that marital status may
shape many different health outcomes, including chronic conditions and
depressive symptoms. 63 While this can include beneficial outcomes like
marriage and children fostering a greater sense of responsibility to stay healthy,
there is also a correlation between marital strain and damage to health over
time. 64 Additionally, the effects of marriage are not limited to the adult
generation. Children are much more likely to achieve the American Dream (i.e.
to have academic success, gainful employment, and upward mobility) if they
have been raised by parents in a stable marriage. 65
As a result of this research, policymakers must see that policy decisions
affecting social ties have the potential to undermine public health. 66 Being
excluded from marriage in the years before Obergefell v. Hodges had an
observable negative impact on members of the LGB community. 67 Scholars
argued that the government was “undermin[ing] their capacity to make healthy
and responsible choices” since they were denied the healthy choice of
marriage. 68 Similarly, forcing disabled people to choose between health care and
marriage does not lead to a happy, healthy family life. 69
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The positioning of marriage as a fundamental legal right occurred alongside
the independent living movement for disabled people. 70 As marriage became
increasingly embedded into the public consciousness as a right that should be
accessible to all citizens, disabled people were initiating widespread advocacy
to move out of institutions and into the community. The independent living
62. Umberson & Montez, supra note 18.
63. See id. at S55; Theodore F. Robles, Marital Quality and Health: Implications for Marriage
in the 21st Century, 23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 427, 428 (2014).
64. Umberson & Montez, supra note 18, at S57.
65. WILCOX ET AL., supra note 34, at 6.
66. Umberson & Montez, supra note 18, at S60.
67. In this Article, the term “LGB” will be used instead of “LGBTQIA+” when describing the
populations that are defined by sexual orientation, not gender identity or expression, and who are
more likely to seek access to same-sex marriage. See, e.g., David S. Buckel, Government Affixes a
Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples When It Imposes Civil Unions & Denies Access to
Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 73, 78–79 (2005) (discussing how LGB youths learn their
future committed relationships are marked as unworthy through exclusion from marriage).
68. Id. at 79.
69. Farley, supra note 20, at 45.
70. Compare TIM MCNEESE, DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 98–99 (Melissa York ed.,
2014) (ebook), with Jill Shenker, A Selective History of Marriage in the United States, AGAINST
THE CURRENT (Sept.–Oct. 2004), https://againstthecurrent.org/atc112/p370/ [https://perma.cc/Y9
TC-LFYT].
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movement has not been mainstream for much longer than the movement toward
full marriage equality. 71
A.

The Fight for Marriage Equality

The fundamental right to marry has been contested throughout many periods
of U.S. legal history beginning in the twentieth century, most notably in four
cases: Loving v. Virginia, Zablocki v. Redhail, Turner v. Safley, and Obergefell
v. Hodges. 72 In the 1967 Loving decision, the Supreme Court determined that
state laws prohibiting interracial marriage violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that such prohibitions violated a “fundamental
freedom.” 73 The Court also reasoned that the post-War Amendments, namely
the Fourteenth, were intended to remove legal distinctions among “all persons
born or naturalized in the United States.” 74 As such, any racial restrictions on
the right to marry are now seen as unconstitutional.
Eleven years later in Zablocki, the Supreme Court overturned a Wisconsin
statute that prevented noncustodial parents from being granted a marriage
license if they were delinquent on child support payments or if they could not
show that the child would never require welfare benefits. 75 In this particular
case, the child had received public benefits since birth and would continue to
qualify, even if the noncustodial parent had been current in his support
payments. 76 As a result, he and others in his position were effectively deprived
of the right to marry, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 77 In its reasoning, the Court applied a strict scrutiny
standard, meaning the limitation on the right to marry had to be closely tailored
to advance state interests. 78 Since the statute was intended to operate as a
“collection device” and yet it merely prevented the applicant from marrying
without directly enforcing any support obligations, the Court determined that the
statute did not meet the standard set forth and was unconstitutional. 79
Piggybacking off of the language from Loving, the Supreme Court reiterated the
fundamental importance of marriage as a building block of society. 80
Similarly, in Turner, the Supreme Court found that a Missouri marriage
regulation prohibiting prison inmates from marrying unless the prison
71. Compare MCNEESE, supra note 70, with Shenker, supra note 70.
72. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
73. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 377.
76. Id. at 378.
77. Id. at 377, 382.
78. Id. at 388.
79. Id. at 389.
80. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
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superintendent approved the marriage was also unconstitutional. 81 Even
applying a lesser standard of scrutiny, the Court found that the regulation was
not reasonably related to penological objectives. 82 Additionally, the Court noted
that, in addition to the regulation being an “exaggerated response” far beyond
what would be reasonably related to a penological objective, the regulation also
had an unintended effect of restricting the fundamental right of civilians to marry
a person they love, in this case a prisoner. 83
Nearly half a century after the foundation was laid in Loving, the Court
extended constitutional protection to same-sex marriages in Obergefell. 84 In the
opinion, Justice Kennedy described marriage as an institution that has evolved
over time but has nevertheless had a “transcendent importance” to all people,
regardless of their station. 85 He stated that over time, “new dimensions of
freedom” may become apparent to future generations and newer laws respecting
those freedoms will take shape in the political sphere before becoming part of
the judicial process. 86
In Obergefell, the Court made a subtle yet profound shift in how it discusses
marriage, asserting that access to marriage respects the dignity and autonomy of
those involved and, importantly, that this right opens the door to other rights and
privileges. 87 First in Lawrence v. Texas, then a few years later in Obergefell, the
Court acknowledged that policing intimate behavior raised dignitary concerns. 88
Relatedly, the Obergefell Court recognized that same-sex couples were not
merely asking for the ability to marry, but for “equal dignity in the eyes of the
law[,]” which consists of two contradictory aspects: the right to privacy and the
right to public recognition of family relationships. 89
Before the Obergefell decision, many states recognized the unfairness and
inequality of state restrictions that prohibited same-sex marriage. These states
created a similar institution called a civil union, sometimes called a domestic
partnership. 90 A civil union had marriage-like qualities and was traditionally a
status offered exclusively to same-sex couples. 91 However, a civil union was
81. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1987).
82. Id. at 99.
83. Id. at 97–98.
84. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
85. Id. at 656–57.
86. Id. at 660.
87. Id. at 666. See also Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to
Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1394 (2010) (discussing how dignity concerns implicated by laws
that selectively deny marriage rights to same-sex couples have consistently been disregarded by
courts in the past).
88. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 666.
89. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681; Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 87, at 1406.
90. Heidi L. Brady & Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Precarious Status of Domestic Partnerships
for the Elderly in a Post-Obergefell World, 24 ELDER L.J. 49, 50 (2016).
91. Id.
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still viewed as an “inferior status, with an impact that diminishes the sum of its
parts.” 92 Marriage’s superior status was emphasized in the Obergefell opinion,
in which Justice Kennedy poignantly stated that marriage “embodies the highest
ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital
union, two people become something greater than once they were.” 93
B.

The Disability Rights Movement

Laws concerning disabled people in America date back to 1636, when the
Plymouth Colony passed a law to provide for men who had become disabled
when serving in the military. 94 Beginning in the 1700s, some American
communities began establishing institutions for the care of disabled people in an
environment that was cut off from the rest of society. 95 This segregationist goal
was perhaps most clearly exemplified in the late 1800s with the advent of “ugly
laws.” 96 These laws, which rose sharply in popularity immediately after the Civil
War, prohibited disabled people with visible disabilities from being seen in
public places. 97
After World War II, the tide began to turn. Rather than hiding disabled
Americans, many of whom were veterans, the government developed programs
intended to mainstream disabled people and otherwise encourage their
integration into society. 98 By 1972, an advocacy organization for disabled
people called the Center for Independent Living sprouted up on the campus of
University of California – Berkeley. 99 The trend toward full societal integration
of disabled people, known as the independent living movement, eventually led
to the ADA, which was signed into law in 1990. 100
The ADA states in part that “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 101 Federal
regulations further require that public entities “shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures” necessary to avoid
discrimination unless the modifications would “fundamentally alter” the

92. Buckel, supra note 67, at 79.
93. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 666.
94. McNEESE, supra note 70, at 98.
95. Id.
96. Susan M. Schweik and Robert A. Wilson, Ugly Laws, EUGENICS ARCHIVE, https://eugen
icsarchive.ca/discover/tree/54d39e27f8a0ea4706000009 (2015) (last visited Mar. 3, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/BPK2-KQ42].
97. Id.
98. MCNEESE, supra note 70, at 99.
99. History of TheCIL, THECIL, https://www.thecil.org/history (last visited Mar. 7, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/5ZEV-M54X].
100. Stapleton et al., supra note 35, at 706.
101. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2009).
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service. 102 At times, however, courts have taken a narrow view of what “policies,
practices, or procedures” may be included in this mandate, with some having
held that the accessibility mandate does not extend to custody hearings or other
court proceedings. 103 Marriage policies, however, have not been challenged on
ADA grounds.
In 1999, less than a decade after the ADA was passed, the Supreme Court
extended the ADA mandate to include full community integration wherever
possible, as opposed to the institutional, segregated treatment that had been the
norm. 104 Respondents in that case, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, insisted that
Title II of the ADA’s purpose is to overcome barriers to the full participation of
disabled people in “all aspects of community life.” 105 A Senate report even
stated that discrimination includes “exclusion, or denial of benefits, services, or
other opportunities that are as effective and meaningful as those provided to
others.” 106 Marriage and its connected benefits must be included in this
consideration.
C. Disability Marriage Rights Throughout History
Discouraging disabled people from marrying and from being marriage
partners has a long-standing history in America. 107 The eugenics movement
reinforced and legitimized false cultural beliefs that led to disabled people being
relegated to the outside of most personal relationships. These false assumptions
informed policies that were written in a different era and have not been updated
to reflect modern American values, particularly since the independent living
movement.
1. Eugenic Origins
For upwards of 150 years, marriage restrictions based on disability have
been part of U.S. legal history. 108 Beginning in 1846, states passed laws barring
marriage if one or both partners had a disability. 109 These laws often had the

102. 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(7) (1998); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132
(2009).
103. Compare Belt, supra note 9 (discussing the fact that some courts have exempted custody
proceedings from ADA requirements) with Chapter 7: The Family Law System: Custody and
Visitation, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, https://ncd.gov/publications/2012/sep272012/ch7 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2021) (asserting that custody proceedings are covered by Title II of the ADA)
[https://perma.cc/ZW9F-DHYK].
104. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
105. Respondent’s Brief at 27, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98536), 1999 WL 144128 at *28.
106. Id. at *27.
107. Belt, supra note 9, at 3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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intent of preventing procreation or “the spread of disease through marriage,” and
as such, applied to women only if they were under forty-five years old,
presumably to coincide with their assumed fertility. 110 Violators could be sent
to prison. 111 In 1905, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that such a law
could be upheld when one or both partners had epilepsy, because it was a
“conviction of modern society that disease is largely preventable by proper
precautions,” and certain liberties may be narrowed to prevent the spread of
disease. 112
Restrictions on the right to procreate became more prevalent in the early
twentieth century. 113 In the infamous Buck v. Bell decision, the Supreme Court
officially condoned forced sterilization of people with physical and mental
disabilities. 114 “It is better for all the world,” said Justice Holmes, “if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind.” 115 As a result of this decision, over 60,000 disabled people have been
involuntarily sterilized in the United States (500,000 worldwide) and the Buck
v. Bell decision has still never been formally overturned. 116
Although openly eugenic laws have fallen out of official favor, the
perceptions and opinions that led to, or perhaps arose from, the eugenics
movement still have echoes in marriage and family planning policies that
dissuade disabled people from approaching legal marriage. 117 These cultural
beliefs find their roots in representations of disabled people as either non-sexual
or hypersexual. 118 Either extreme has been used as a reason to wrongfully deny
disabled people the right to marry and procreate in order to prevent disability
from “potentially tainting the human race.” 119 Now, disability is often used as a
joke in the mainstream dating environment to signify a laughable lack of sexual

110. J.P. Chamberlain, Eugenics and Limitations of Marriage, 5 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L.
253, 254 (1923).
111. Id.
112. Gould v. Gould, 61 A. 604, 605 (Conn. 1905).
113. Elof Axel Carlson, The Hoosier Connection: Compulsory Sterilization as Moral Hygiene,
in A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT TO THE HUMAN
GENOME ERA 11, 11, 21 (Paul A. Lombardo ed., 2011) (ebook).
114. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
115. Id.
116. PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES x, xiii (2008) (ebook).
117. E.g., Lorna Collier, Seeking Intimacy, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N: MONITOR ON PSYCH. (Dec.
2017), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/12/seeking-intimacy. See Kimberly Mutcherson,
Disability, Procreation, and Justice in the United States, 6 LAWS 2017, at 5–6.
118. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and
Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1325 (2009).
119. Id.
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desirability. 120 Whether this opinion led to the eugenics movement or was borne
out of it, it has had its place in the public consciousness for many years.
2. Contemporary Cultural Barriers
Despite popular misconceptions, disabled people are as capable of falling in
love as non-disabled people, and often have the same desire to be married and
start a family. 121 However, some “barriers to entry” surrounding intimate
relationships––including the disability marriage penalty, concerns about public
perception, and even physical accessibility––can affect the decision to enter or
remain in a relationship with a disabled partner. 122 As a result, the rate of first
marriages for disabled people ages eighteen to forty-nine is 41.1%, considerably
less than the 71.8% overall rate. 123
Since intimate relationships are considered a social good, exclusion from
that domain has welfare consequences. 124 These consequences include fewer or
different interactions in other domains, such as employment. 125 In fact, the
persistent unemployment rate (meaning unemployed for at least twelve
consecutive months) for disabled people is 59.8%, which may be caused, at least
in part, by misconceptions about disabled people that are in turn perpetuated by
their lack of inclusion in other domains. 126 Because so few disabled people are
present in any given workplace (and by extension, other public spaces), disabled
people have fewer opportunities to socialize––either formally or informally––
with people with whom they might want a relationship of any kind. 127 The social
isolation that results from these factors hides the realities of declining health and
welfare––and the lives of disabled people––from the view of the wider
community. 128
120. Id. at 1327.
121. Evans, supra note 23; Stasio, supra note 2.
122. Emens, supra note 118, at 1370.
123. Philip Cohen, Marriage Among People with Disabilities (Save the Data Edition), THE
SOC’Y PAGES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://thesocietypages.org/ccf/2014/11/24/marriage-rates-amongpeople-with-disabilities-save-the-data-edition/ [https://perma.cc/4CF8-AN2K].
124. Emens, supra note 118, at 1310.
125. Id.
126. DANIELLE M. TAYLOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2014, at 14 (2018). According to a 2015 study finding pervasive
disability discrimination in employment, applicants with disabilities were twenty-six percent less
likely to be hired than their non-disabled counterparts, even when their disability was not expected
to affect their productivity or their ability to meet the job-related needs of the employer. Mason
Ameri et al., The Disability Employment Puzzle: A Field Experiment on Employer Hiring Behavior
9, 14–15 (NBER Working Paper No. 21560), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21560.
127. See, e.g., Loring Jones, Unemployment and Social Integration: A Review, 15 J. SOCIO. &
SOC. WELFARE 161, 164 (1988) (“The loss of work dislodges people from a social role that may
have made them feel a part of a larger social community and given their lives a purpose . . . .
Consequently[,] the loss of work is bound to have negative . . . social consequences.”).
128. Miller, supra note 14, at 108.
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3. Policy Neglect
The requirements to which beneficiaries continue to be held have not kept
pace with changes in the economy or inflation. Most Social Security programs
were developed in the era of single-income households, when fewer women
worked outside the home. 129 Furthermore, healthcare costs composed twentyfive percent of the maximum SSI payout for couples in 1980, while today these
costs total eighty-three percent of the maximum payout. 130 Additionally, if the
$3000 SSI asset cap for couples were adjusted for inflation, the amount would
total more than $6000 in 2019. 131 The average annual cost of a nursing home
stay also rose from $8268 in 1977 to $46,692 in 1999, a six-fold increase that
does not match up with Social Security increases. 132
There might not be much logic to the amount requirements as, according to
Michael Tanner, a specialist in social welfare policy at the Cato Institute,
“[t]here wasn’t a group of philosopher economist kings who were developing
the perfect eligibility level . . . . These things are thrown together by
congressional committees on the basis of what can get votes.” 133 Nevertheless,
of the three major income assistance programs––SSI, Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF), and the Food Stamp program––only SSI differentiates
eligibility and benefit amount based on marital status alone. 134
In addition, some have found that inconsistent standards apply to Social
Security programs and Medicaid. For Medicaid specifically, a non-disabled
spouse’s income is factored in, but they do not automatically share the benefits
of Medicaid. 135 There is no way to pool Medicaid as a resource, yet eligibility is
partially determined by marital status. 136 While private and public insurance are
meant to serve the same purpose, public insurance considers income but private
insurance does not. As Lori O’Haver, the non-disabled fiancée of a disabled
Medicaid beneficiary said, “[m]y employer doesn’t look at his income for my
benefits.” 137 In fact, in 1996 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

129. Stern, supra note 1.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Miller, supra note 14, at 89.
133. Stern, supra note 1.
134. Balkus & Wilschke, supra note 25, at 3.
135. Teresa McMinn, Wife or Caregiver? Quadriplegic Faces Decision, CUMBERLAND TIMESNEWS (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.times-news.com/news/local_news/wife-or-caregiver-quadriple
gic-faces-decision/article_58e8e8b6-f462-11e9-b855-cbe4ddb01ea7.html [https://perma.cc/EZK3
-MGU3].
136. See id.
137. Id.
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(ERISA) to make that consideration illegal. 138 Still, when a Medicaid
beneficiary is married to a non-beneficiary, marriage assets are split 50–50 when
determining eligibility, regardless of who has actual access to the assets or how
the assets would be split in the case of a divorce. 139
Additionally, it has not gone unnoticed that in 2010, Congress repealed the
estate tax and raised exemption levels to allow the extremely rich to pass on their
wealth to their loved ones without paying estate taxes. 140 This stands in contrast
to estate recovery, in which, after a Medicaid beneficiary’s death, the state may
collect any assets that were not counted in determining eligibility, including the
decedent’s home. 141 That is, while laws applied to the rich have kept pace with
modern sensibilities, those that affect Medicaid beneficiaries have remained
mostly unchanged since 1972. 142 Perhaps unsurprisingly, benign neglect has
long been a hallmark of the political and legislative approach to disability. 143
IV. PRIOR EFFORTS AT REFORM
There has not been much direct legislative effort by either political party to
alleviate the disability marriage penalty, despite its disparate impact. 144 This
may come down to, on one hand, a Republican reluctance to spend money on
welfare and, on the other, a Democratic reluctance to single out disabled people
when everyone in poverty needs support. 145 Regardless of the reason, disability
benefits have not been significantly discussed by legal commentators, and so

138. FAQs on HIPAA Portability and Nondiscrimination Requirements for Workers, U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB. 1, 3, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our-activities/re
source-center/faqs/hipaa-consumer.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8QXD-2P
4R].
139. Miller, supra note 14, at 87.
140. Id. at 99.
141. Id. at 87.
142. Shaun Heasley, Lawmakers Look to Update SSI Program, DISABILITY SCOOP (Sept. 23,
2019), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2019/09/23/lawmakers-look-update-ssi-program/27200/
[https://perma.cc/ZU86-ML3Y].
143. See, e.g., Kitty Cone, Short History of the 504 Sit In, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF.
FUND, https://dredf.org/504-sit-in-20th-anniversary/short-history-of-the-504-sit-in/ (last visited
Feb. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/45JH-ALW4] (describing the extensive efforts of disability
activists over three years to get regulations issued for Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973); Michelle Diament, 80 Arrested in Nation’s Capital at Disability Rights Protest, DISABILITY
SCOOP (May 21, 2019), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2019/05/21/80-arrested-disability-rights
-protest/26651/ [https://perma.cc/KX9K-AMP6] (discussing two 2019 disability rights protests
seeking fulfillment of Olmstead’s community integration mandate that had been made twenty years
prior).
144. See Stern, supra note 1. But see infra Part V.A.
145. Stern, supra note 1.
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little to no attention has been paid to potential changes and updates to
programs. 146
Because the disability marriage penalty exists at the intersection of welfare,
health law, disability law, elder law, and family law, potential solutions may be
found in all corners. Part of the difficulty in determining potential solutions to
the penalty is that no single solution can make everyone happy or include
everyone it should. For now, we have a few existing policies that may be applied
to assuage the penalty.
A.

Solutions from Elder Law

Many older Americans, like disabled adults, depend on benefits like SSI and
Medicaid. 147 However, unlike many disabled adults, the elderly often have a
lifetime’s worth of assets that prevent them from meeting Medicaid’s financial
eligibility criteria, which is sometimes the best option for managing the costs of
a nursing home. 148 As a result of these factors, special considerations have been
made to enable eligibility for the elderly population. Some previous solutions
include voluntary impoverishment, civil unions, and spousal refusal.
1. Voluntary Impoverishment
For some time, financial and legal advisors encouraged elderly clients to
give away all of their assets as gifts and get divorced––to voluntarily impoverish
themselves––before they needed a nursing home so that they could qualify for
Medicaid when that time came. 149 Children and others to whom the elderly
person gifted their assets could then help pay the elderly person’s expenses,
allowing them to maintain a reasonably familiar quality of life. 150 Congress was
so frustrated by this practice, they made it a crime for citizens to practice it and
for lawyers to advise their clients to do it. 151 However, such a punitive measure
was quickly repealed in part to not target the elderly and courts have not upheld
the part that punishes lawyers. 152 The practice still remains popular as it seems
to be the most straightforward way to qualify for Medicaid. 153 Even so, the
complexity of look back period rules (rules regarding how far back Medicaid is
allowed to look at your finances to determine whether you have been giving

146. Kathy P. Holder, In Sickness and in Health? Disability Benefits as Marital Property, 24 J.
FAM. L. 657, 658 (1985); Rains, supra note 49, at 562.
147. Evans, supra note 23.
148. Miller, supra note 14, at 89–90.
149. Id. at 81.
150. Id. at 83.
151. Id. at 81–82.
152. Id. at 82.
153. See Miller, supra note 14, at 108.
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away assets) makes voluntary impoverishment akin to “walking through a
minefield blindfolded.” 154
Furthermore, even if a person successfully sheds all their assets and does not
have an income, this practice assumes that they have assets in the first place.
Since there is both an income limit and an asset limit when qualifying for
Medicaid, younger disabled people may not even earn a high enough amount to
make giving away their assets possible. SSI and SSDI rules do not allow for a
substantial savings or much outside income, so many disabled people live in
persistent poverty. 155 Additionally, in eligibility determinations, SSA includes
any housing or financial assistance from friends or family members. 156 Thus,
even receiving outside help (assuming a person has that option) may hurt the
person’s eligibility for Medicaid.
2. Civil Unions
Another option in some states allows elderly Americans who need to get
divorced or cannot be married for Medicaid reasons but who want some public
recognition of a relationship to be granted a civil union––the same institution
that was open to some same-sex couples pre-Obergefell. 157 This status was
granted to same-sex couples and couples in which at least one participant was
elderly before the Obergefell decision was made. 158 Legislators loosened the
requirements for civil unions to include the elderly because they were worried
about protecting the Social Security and retirement benefits of elderly couples
who wanted to get remarried. 159 Significantly, the Social Security Act does not
mention civil unions or domestic partnerships in any provision, so no penalty
would be directly applicable. 160
In the years leading up to the Obergefell decision, however, a lot of
sociological scholarship was done about the effects of civil unions on the LGB
community. Civil unions were widely thought to give same-sex relationships
“second-class” status compared to the traditional, more privileged status that
marriage allowed. 161 In deciding Obergefell, the Supreme Court even stated as
much: “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers,
[the] children [of same-sex couples] suffer the stigma of knowing their families
154. Id. at 86.
155. TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 15.
156. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Living Arrangements, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-living-ussi.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/YEJ9XBK6].
157. Brady & Wilson, supra note 14, at 53.
158. Id. at 50, 51.
159. Id. at 62.
160. Id. at 87. But see Rains, supra note 49 for a description of the holding out provision.
Whether domestic partnerships or civil unions are considered “holding out” is not specified.
161. Buckel, supra note 67, at 81.
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are somehow lesser.” 162 There is no reason to think that an option deemed
morally and socially unacceptable for the LGB community should be acceptable
for the disability community. Furthermore, the “holding out” provision may
consider couples in a civil union to be holding out as married, which would force
them to face the same penalty that they would if they had gotten legally married,
essentially excluding disabled people from this option.
3. Spousal Refusal
Similar to voluntary impoverishment, legislators have created “spousal
refusal” as a protective measure against spousal impoverishment when only one
spouse needs Medicaid. 163 Spousal refusal allows a non-Medicaid spouse to sign
a waiver rejecting all financial responsibility for their spouse, which then
excludes their personal income and assets from eligibility calculations. 164
Historically, spousal refusal was only offered to a community spouse when the
other spouse was institutionalized. 165 However, recent changes to legislation
have allowed couples with one spouse who receives home- and communitybased Medicaid services (HCBS) to also utilize spousal refusal. 166 This
technique to avoid impoverishment is not widespread; it is only available
currently in New York and Florida, but it is gaining notoriety. 167
If spousal refusal were to become an option in all states, it would be a partial,
but not full, cure for the disability marriage penalty. Spousal refusal for an
institutionalized spouse is a permanently available legal fixture, but extending
that refusal to a non-institutionalized spouse who needs Medicaid is not. 168
Spousal refusal rules that cover spouses who wish to live in the community by
utilizing HCBS were first established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and are
set to expire in 2023 absent an extension from Congress. 169 More than just an
inconvenience, this means that at any point, standards could change and couples
would be denied the security of knowing that their marriage would not affect
their Medicaid eligibility in the future. Similarly, spousal refusal is effectively a

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646.
FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 14, at 19.
Id.
Star, supra note 48.
Id.
How Spousal Refusal Works as a Strategy to Medicaid Eligibility,
https://www.medicaidplanningassistance.org/spousalMEDICAIDPLANNINGASSISTANCE.ORG,
refusal/ (last updated Jan. 5, 2021).
168. Star, supra note 48.
169. Spousal Impoverishment Rules | Protecting the Income, Assets & Homes of Medicaid
Applicants’ Spouses, MEDICAIDPLANNINGASSISTANCE.ORG, https://www.medicaidplanningassis
tance.org/spousal-protections/#:~:text=Spousal%20impoverishment%20rules%20are%20federal,
for%20long%2Dterm%20care%20Medicaid. (last updated Jan. 6, 2021).
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state law concept 170 and, unless it is uniformly adopted in all states, married
couples may face differing standards regarding community property.
B.

An Unlikely Possibility

The issue becomes more complicated when considering that both Medicaid
and marriage are primarily state-controlled institutions with small but significant
differences in requirements. 171 Scholars have noted that one potential solution
to all marriage inequality issues is for states to refuse to grant a marriage status
at all, and instead leave that determination to religious groups or other private
entities. 172 This proposal was made in February of 2020 by Missouri State
Representative Adam Schnelting. 173 Such a bill would nullify the disability
marriage penalty because it would be impossible to be married and hold out as
married if marriage does not exist in the state. However, this proposal and those
like it have historically been bad faith attempts to disallow same-sex marriage, 174
without consideration of how it would affect the whole range of benefits and
rights linked to marriage. Since “the right to marry is fundamental as a matter of
history and tradition,” such a controversial change is unlikely without major
upset. 175
V. POTENTIAL NEW SOLUTIONS
At the current crossroads, many options are available moving forward to
alleviate the disability marriage penalty. At the end of 2019, Representative Raúl
Grijalva presented a bill called The Supplemental Security Income Restoration
Act of 2019 to Congress. 176 This bill purported to completely repeal the
disability marriage penalty. 177 President Biden made a campaign promise to
repeal the penalty as well. 178 Regardless of specifics, some kind of repeal must
be implemented. In the meantime, several steps can be taken to soften the
disability marriage penalty’s impact.
A.

The Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2019

The Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2019 (H.R. 4280)
was one recently proposed solution to the disability marriage penalty problem.
170. See FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 14, at 19.
171. Balkus & Wilschke, supra note 25, at 4; Miller, supra note 14, at 85.
172. Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 87, at 1378.
173. See H.B. 2173, 100th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2020).
174. See Michael C. Dorf, Does the Constitution Permit a State to Abolish Marriage?, JUSTIA
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/03/21/constitution-permit-state-abolish-marriage
[https://perma.cc/3K4C-VGUJ].
175. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 647.
176. Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2019, H.R. 4280, 116th Cong. (2019).
177. See id.
178. The Biden Plan, supra note 15.
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The bill would have updated the asset and income limits for individuals and
couples on SSI and would require that the limit update yearly in line with
inflation. 179 Most importantly, it would have repealed any penalty for marrying
or receiving any kind of assistance from family members or friends. 180
This bill would have increased the asset limit for individuals from $1500 to
$10,000 for the calendar year 2020 and would require that the amount increase
in line with inflation every subsequent year. 181 For couples in which both
spouses receive SSI, the asset limit would have increased from $2250 to $20,000
for the calendar year 2020, and that amount would also increase in line with
inflation. 182 Thus, asset limits would dramatically increase and people with
disabilities could have a small savings without fear of losing their health care
benefits. In the context of marriage, the bill would have allowed disabled
spouses to retain some community property and personal assets within their
marriage. 183 Furthermore, the twenty-five percent decrease in benefits that
occurs when two beneficiaries marry each other would have been eliminated. 184
As a result, the amount that dual-beneficiary married couples make would have
risen from 150% of a single beneficiary’s income to 200% of a single
beneficiary’s income.
Additionally, beneficiaries would not have been required to report “in-kind
maintenance and support” to SSA. 185 This means that non-employment related
income or assistance would not be included in a beneficiary’s eligibility
determination. SSA would have no reason to investigate whether a couple is
“holding out” under this provision because pooling resources would not be
prohibited.
Next, this bill would have repealed the penalty for disposing of assets for
less than fair market value. 186 If one spouse wants to give away assets in order
to qualify for Medicaid, even to their spouse or other family member, they
currently may do so only if they sell their assets for fair market value. 187 When
trying to decrease the value of assets, selling things for fair market value would
serve little purpose. Thus, voluntary impoverishment would have become easier
under this provision.
Finally, this bill would have eliminated any consideration of a nonbeneficiary spouse’s income or assets in eligibility determinations. 188 When
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

H.R. 4280 § 2.
Id. §§ 3, 5.
Id. § 2(c)(2).
Id. § 2(c)(1).
See id. § 5(a).
See H.R. 4280 § 2(c)(2).
Id. § 3(a)(1).
Id. § 4.
See id.
Id. § 5(a).
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asked, Representative Elissa Slotkin, a cosponsor of the bill, stated that “this bill
brings the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program’s outdated limits up to
speed with inflation—a common-sense adjustment that will make a huge
difference for individuals and families caring for someone with disabilities.” 189
Although she did not specifically mention the marriage aspects of the bill, the
freedom to marry without losing benefits would be of profound importance to
beneficiaries with disabilities.
However, the Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2019 was
introduced during the 116th Congress, which adjourned on January 3, 2021. 190
The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Worker and Family Support in
September 2019 but unfortunately never received a vote. 191 Curiously,
Representative Grijalva has proposed a nearly identical bill at every
congressional session since 2013. 192 Each time, it has died in its first or second
committee without any record giving a reason for its failure. 193 At the time of
writing, no one has yet introduced a similar bill during the 117th Congress,
although Representative John Katko of New York has recently proposed a bill
that would eliminate the disability marriage penalty but only explicitly for
people with developmental or intellectual disabilities. 194
B.

A Presidential Priority?

In contrast to previous presidents, President Biden mentioned the disability
marriage penalty during his campaign and made a promise to work to eliminate
it. 195 More generally, he has promised to prioritize breaking down societal and
economic barriers for people with disabilities, including encouraging economic
self-sufficiency and ensuring access to long-term services and supports. 196 In
addition, President Biden has specifically vowed to offer everyone the choice to
purchase public health insurance, which might function as a successful
workaround that allows people to keep Medicaid benefits no matter their income

189. Heasley, supra note 142.
190. H.R. 4280 (116th): Congress: Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2019,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr4280 (last visited Mar. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/JP3V-6K4Z] [hereinafter GovTrack H.R. 4280].
191. Id.; H.R. 4280 – Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2019, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4280 (last visited Mar. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/F7RX-TLLD].
192. GovTrack H.R. 4280, supra note 192.
193. See id.
194. H.R. 761, 117th Cong. (2021).
195. The Biden Plan, supra note 15. In addition to specifically eliminating the disability
marriage penalty, President Biden has also vowed to make spousal impoverishment protections
permanent, rather than the current system of needing to be recertified on a yearly basis. Id.
196. Id.
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or that of their spouse. 197 Finally, he has promised to increase income and asset
limits to more reasonable levels for people who receive SSI and SSDI. 198
In his first month in office, President Biden took action to protect SSDI
beneficiaries from a Trump-era regulation that was projected to lead to a $2.6
billion decrease in benefits. 199 Additionally, he has proven to prioritize access
needs of disabled Americans by prominently including an American Sign
Language (ASL) interpreter during his inauguration ceremony, by including
ASL interpreters in livestreamed briefings, and by expanding accessibility
features of the White House website. 200 Although President Biden has not yet
approached the disability marriage penalty, he is poised to be a leader who is
eager to listen to and learn from the disability community.
C. Principles of Change
The simplest, most straightforward solution to the disability marriage
penalty is for SSA to eliminate marriage as a factor in determining eligibility for
SSI or SSDI. However, SSA has balked at any proposal to eliminate the couple
as an eligible unit, finding that such a change would be too expensive. 201 SSA
has even calculated that the change would cost “approximately $900 million
annually for current married couple beneficiaries alone.” 202 However, when this
amount is considered in light of the SSI program’s FY 2020 budget of nearly
$42 billion, $900 million––2.15% of the total––is a small price to pay for
fundamental rights. 203 Additionally, the $900 million figure may not include the
fact that couples who live together “assist the State by [assuring] support for the
financial, physical, and emotional health of their participants,” ultimately saving
money by maintaining higher levels of health and wellness than they would have
alone. 204 The $900 million may also not include the savings from the regulatory
expense of investigating whether couples are holding out.

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews, 84 Fed.
Reg. 63596 (Nov. 18, 2019). See Annie Reneau, Biden Withdraws ‘Horrific’ Trump Rule Attacking
Social Security Disability Recipients, GOOD MAG. (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.good.is/bidensocial-security-disability [https://perma.cc/9LNA-4KRJ].
200. For a summary of accessibility efforts made by the Biden administration in its first month,
see Jeanine Santucci, Early Commitment to Accessibility for Disabled Americans Has Advocates
Hopeful for Biden’s Tenure, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/
01/biden-white-house-prioritizing-accessibility-disabled-americans/6662321002/ (last updated
Feb. 1, 2021, 2:27 PM) [https://perma.cc/B4HV-DF4V].
201. Balkus & Wilschke, supra note 25, at 5–6.
202. Id. at 6.
203. FY 2020 President’s Budget, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY20Files
/2020BST_1.pdf (last visited Feb 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/HQV2-H222].
204. Brady & Wilson, supra note 90, at 53–54.
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In the meantime, without making any drastic or expensive changes to the
system, better benefits counseling for disabled people must be a higher
priority. 205 Currently, the disability marriage penalty is not publicized and
information about it is difficult to track down. In one case, a Medicaid
beneficiary who was considering marriage called her local Medicaid office to
ask about her options. 206 An employee told her that no one would help her
personally, but she could mail in some documents and await a decision. 207 In
another case, a couple repeatedly tried to contact their county office to learn
about their future options as a couple, but no one who they spoke with would
commit to a meeting. 208 Medicaid and Social Security should not be denying
information to people who want to be well-informed before making a major life
decision.
Another option that would encourage healthy marriages and discourage
Medicaid divorces is to eliminate policies that shift the burden of caregiving
responsibilities to family members. 209 This burden creates stressful family
dynamics and puts unnecessary pressure on relationships. 210 If divorcing for
Medicaid-related reasons is a “perversion of the law” then the government
should do more to encourage happy, healthy families in which all people can get
married and have their health care needs met, without having to choose between
the two.
It cannot be the case that the progressive mandate of the ADA was designed
to prop up and continue the legacy of poverty among the disability community.
In fact, Congress predicated the ADA in part on the Commerce Clause,
determining that it was unfair and discriminatory to “depriv[e] the economy of
[disabled people’s] working potential and their patronage.” 211 This does not
comport with SSA’s conscription of those who receive disability benefits to
being pushed below the poverty line, and pushed even farther once they choose
to marry. 212
This “stigma of exclusion” has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court
in the Olmstead decision and by Congress in forming the ADA, but disability
marriage equality has not yet captured the attention of the Supreme Court, other
than to hold that the disability marriage penalty does not violate the Due Process
205. FREMSTAD & VALLAS, supra note 4, at 9.
206. David Lapp, The Strivers Punished by Marriage Penalties, INST. FOR FAM. STUD.: BLOG
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-strivers-punished-by-marriage-penalties/ [https://per
ma.cc/4P7Z-28TX].
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Umberson & Montez, supra note 18, at S60–S61.
210. Id.
211. Respondent’s Brief at 50, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98536), 1999 WL 144128.
212. Rains, supra note 49, at 568.
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment and, in 1977, to alleviate the penalty for some
SSDI beneficiaries who marry SSDI or SSI beneficiaries. 213
VI. CONCLUSION
In the Obergefell decision, Justice Kennedy said, “The nature of injustice is
that we may not always see it in our own times.” 214 For a long time, the injustice
of the disability marriage penalty was not seen. The pain and shame of being
forced to choose between marriage and health care was held silently and solely
by those who made the choice. Since the Olmstead decision, disabled people
have had a recognized right to inclusion in all aspects of the community. 215 Even
before that right was established, Congress asserted in the ADA that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.” 216 But such a simple mandate has complicated exceptions.
Acknowledging the repeated assurances by the Supreme Court that the right
to marriage is fundamental, it is also not without conditions or limitations as
prescribed by the state or other entities. Medicaid, which was originally intended
as a health care resource of last resort for the disabled, blind, and poor, may
currently place legal conditions on beneficiaries based on marital status, as may
the Social Security Administration. Although disabled people are not directly
legally barred from marriage, they “must pick only two out of three: marriage,
economic security and comprehensive health coverage.” 217
Regardless of these limitations, it is not difficult to imagine a system that
does not force disabled people into unnecessary predicaments. Despite the
emotional difficulty, ultimately the choice disabled people must make is always
simple: it is a choice between marital happiness and medical necessity,
regardless of whatever small concessions the system could muster after enough
pushing. 218 The American Dream is supposed to be open to everyone, regardless
of status, and achieving it includes having a fully formed family to come home
to at the end of the day. “Marriage,” as Justice Kennedy put it, “responds to the
universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there. It
offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while
both still live there will be someone to care for the other.” 219 Hopefully one day
all disabled people might be able to know that comfort as well. Hopefully,
213. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Marriage Penalty, supra note 6. See Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47, 55 (1977).
214. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664.
215. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
217. Stern, supra note 1.
218. Farley, supra note 20, at 30.
219. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 667.
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instead of being forced to choose between two paths, disabled people will be
offered a forward-facing life path that has room for two.
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